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CASES NOTED
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-PATENT
AGENTS
Petitioner, the Florida Bar Association, brought an original pro-
ceeding in the Florida Supreme Court' for punishment and restraint of
an alleged unauthorized practice of law. Though not an "attorney at
law," respondent had been duly admitted to practice before the Patent
Office. At the time this action commenced respondent was maintaining an
office in Florida, and was holding himself out to the public as a "patent
attorney." Held, an individual admitted to practice before the Patent
Office must qualify as a member of the state bar association before he
can practice patent law in the State of Florida. State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d
587 (Fla. 1962).A
The judiciary has the inherent power to control and supervise the
practice of law.' When the court is asked to restrain an individual from
the unauthorized practice of law3 it becomes necessary for it to define
the abstract term "practice of law" and to determine whether the alleged
unauthorized practice falls within that definition.' The courts in defining
the limits of the legal practice have consistently broadened its scope far
1. Under Article V, § 23, of the Florida .Constitution, the supreme court is granted
"exclusive jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons
admitted." Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938), interpreted
this article to imply the power to prevent the practice of law by those not admitted to
practice. See: Delaware Optometric Corp. v. Sherwood, 128 A.2d 812 (Del. 1957); People
v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); State v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 111
N.W.2d 543 (1961) ; State v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 23 N.W.2d 720 (1946) ; New Jersey State
Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Associates, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956);
West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959); State v. Keller,
16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W.2d 796 (1962).
IA. Cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WE=K 3079 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1962).
2. E.g., De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940); State v.
Childe, supra note 1; Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 173 N.E.2d
201 (1960); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, supra note 1; 5 Am. JuR. Attorneys § 2
(1936).
3. The unauthorized practice of law is punishable by either contempt, e.g., Delaware
Optometric Corp. v. Sherwood, 128 A.2d 812 (Del. 1957); People v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282,
77 N.E.2d 693 (1948); or by injunction, e.g., Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53
A.2d 800 (1947), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948); Land Title Abstract &
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650 (1934); or possibly a combination of
the two, e.g., State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1962); Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80
Idaho 504, 335 P.2d 62 (1959).
4. The term "practice of law" involves not only 'the doing or performing of services in
a court of justice, In re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 62 P.2d 578 (1936) ; In re Droker, 370
P.2d 242 (Wash. 1962); but in a larger sense includes conveyancing, Land Title Abstract
& Trust Co. v. Dworken, supra note 3; preparation of legal instruments, Idaho State Bar
v. Meservy, supra note 3; offering advice 'to clients, State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, supra note 3.
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beyond services performed in a court of justice, to include activities of
many nonlitigious fields which entail specialized knowledge and ability.5
Thus far, only three cases6 have dealt with the question of whether
practice before the Patent Office does in fact involve the practice of
law. 7 The courts do not quarrel with the power of the Federal Patent
Office to admit non-attorneys to practice before it, but in declaring the
activities of the patent agent as being in fact a "practice of law," they
do challenge the right of the patent agent to conduct that practice within
their respective borders.' In line with this power most states have legisla-
tion restricting the practice of law to members of their bar associations.9
5. New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J.
430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960).
6. In Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949), the
court enjoined the defendant from (1) giving legal advice, (2) preparing, drafting and con-
struing legal documents, (3) rendering legal opinions including those as to patent rights
and infringements, (4) preparation of legal documents for proceedings in tribunals other
than the Patent Office, (5) asserting attorney's lien under Illinois statute, and (6) charging
and collecting fees for legal services. A few years later in Marshall v. New Inventor's
Club, Inc., 69 Ohio L. Abs. 578, 117 N.E.2d 737 (1953), the Ohio Common Pleas Court
enjoined (1) rendering opinions as to patentability, (2) preparing applications for letters
patent, (3) preparing amendments for letters patent, and (4) drafting of contracts, affidavits
and assignments. Finally, Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 173
N.E.2d 201 (1960), an action for declaratory judgment, followed the above case by holding
that Ohio had the right to enjoin activities which it found to be within the definition of
"practice of law."
7. "The-patent attorney's work before the Patent Office consists in the main of the
following duties:
"1. The preparation of a complete description of the invention in a more or less
prescribed form, known as the specification.
"2. The preparation of the claims, which are intended to define the scope of the
patent which is eventually granted.
"3. The preparation of formal drawings from which, in connection with the specifica-
tion, the invention and its mode of use can be understood (such drawings are not always
necessary, e.g., in many chemical cases):
"4. The revision of the claims in the light of prior disclosures cited by the Patent
Examiner so as to define patentable novelty over such disclosures.
, "5. The presentation.of arguments as to why the differences between the subject matter
shown and claimed in the application is patentable over earlier disclosures.
"6. The prosecution of interferences, which are declared when two different applicants
disclose and claim the same patentable invention. This includes the preparation of the pre-
liminary statement, the bringing of motions, the taking of testimony by deposition, and
the briefing and oral argument based on such testimony." Bailey, Practice by Non-Lawyers
Before the United States Patent Office, 15 FED. B.J. 211, 213-14 (1955). See also Topliff v.
Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) wherein the court stated, "The specification and claims
of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated constitute one of the most
difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy."
8. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 '(1949); Battelle
Memorial Institute v. Green, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 173 N.E.2d 201 (1960); Marshall v. New
Inventor's Club, Inc., 69 Ohio L. Abs. 578, 117 N.E.2d 737 (1953).
9. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 31 (1958); ALASXA Coup. LAWS ANN. § 35-2-77 (1949);
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-1-17 (1954); CoNr. GEN. STAT. § 51-88 (1960); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-402 (1936); IAWAI REV. LAWS § 217-14 (1955);- IDAHO CODE ANN. § 3-420 (1948);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-3601.(1933) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 481.02 (1958) ; NEn. RaV. STAT. § 7-101
(1943); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.9 (1955); S.D. CODE § 32.1121 (1939); TENN. CODE
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Two'cases have implied a contrary result. The Colorado court, in
People v. Erbaugh, ° enjoined a patent agent from use of the title "at-
torney," apparently contending that practice before the Patent Office is
not the practice of law." A more recent decision giving support to this
conclusion is Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, wherein
the court, by dicta, stated that since laymen are permitted to practice
before the Patent Office, the work is not legal in nature.'3
In the instant case' 4 the Florida Supreme Court relied heavily on
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg. 5 The court ordered that until Sperry be-
came a member of the Florida Bar he was permanently enjoined from
using the term "patent attorney"; giving legal opinions, including those
as to patentability or infringement; preparing, drafting or construing
legal documents; preparing and prosecuting applications for letters
patent, and amendments thereto; and otherwise engaging in the practice
of law. The court went on to say that this injunction was not to be conr-
strued as affecting any rights which the respondent has to practice before
the Patent Office outside of Florida.' 6 This was the most prohibitive de-
cision by any state thus far, and left the respondent virtually powerless
to carry on any form of Patent Office practice within the confines of
Florida.
As part of his defense the respondent contended that an injunction
would be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, in that it would deprive him of the ability to earn a living
and deprive him of property without due process of law.'7 This was
the first time that a constitutional defense had been raised in a Patent
Office practice case. While on its surface this argument would appear
ANN. § 29-303 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.48.180 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.30
(1957).
10. 42 Colo. 480, 94 Pac. 349 (1908).
11. Ibid.
12. 121 F. Supp. 792 (1954).
13. There are many decisions concerning federal and state administrative agencies other
than the Patent Office. Some of these decisions which are in accord with the majority herein
are: Petition of Kearney, 63 So.2d 630 (Fla. 1953) ; People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8
N.E.2d 941, 111 A.L.R. 1 (1937) ; State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381
(1941); In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31, 144 N.E.2d 24 (1957); Richmond Ass'n
of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937) ; West Virginia State Bar v.
Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959); State v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W.2d
796 (1962). Contra, Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S.E.2d 345 (1957); Matter of
Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E.2d 74 (1938);. De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038,
144 S.W.2d 146 (1940); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), aff'd,
142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948). See also Von Baur, The Practice of Non-Lawyers
Before Administrative Agencies, 15 FED. B.J. 99 (1955); Comment, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 108
(1951).
14. State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1962).
15. 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949).
16. Compare State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 596 (Fla. 1962) with Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Kellogg, Battelle Memorial Institute v. Green, and Marshall v. New Inventor's Club, supra
note 6.
17. State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 596 (Fla. 1962).
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to have merit, the Florida bench had little trouble in disposing of the
contention. 8
In justifying its injunction the court denied any attempt to protect
the legal profession from competition and relied on its obligation to the
public to protect it from incompetent legal representation. 9 However,
when one considers the American concept of dual citizenship, this would
appear to be an obligation of not only the individual states, but the
federal government as well. Therefore, the qualifications exacted by the
Patent Office would appear to be for the purpose of public protection.2 °
It would seem to this author that the decision would stand on firmer
ground had the court also relied on the idea of protecting the legal
profession. This concept is in no way distasteful nor bears an unethical
aura about it. The American Medical Association and similar profes-
sional groups have taken great pains to protect their own. In light of the
many inroads made on the legal profession on the part of banks in the
field of trusts, accountants in the area of tax, insurance companies in
estate planning, realtors and title companies in the realm of real estate
law, and others, it would seem a highly commendable activity on the part
of the American Bar Association and its state subsidiaries to thwart these
and further infringements. Moreover, the result of such an endeavor
18. "The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons who are not ad-
mitted to the bar and for limiting and restricting such practice to licensed members of
the legal profession is not the protection of the members of the bar from competition or
the creation of a monopoly for the members of the legal profession, but is instead the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified
and undisciplined persons over whom the judicial department of the government could
exercise slight or no control." West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 527, 109
S.E.2d 420, 435 (1959) ; Accord, State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.,
20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (1957); Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d
605 (Fla. 1950) ; Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938) ; People
v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); Matter of Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E.2d
74 (1938) ; Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952) ; New Jersey State Bar
Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortgage Associates, 32 N.J. 430, 161 A.2d 257 (1960) ; Mc-
Millen v. McCahan, 167 N.E.2d 541 (C.P. Ohio 1960). It should be noted that this exclusion
of laymen is in no way violative of the due process clause in our Federal Constitution. In
Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n, supra at 289, the court stated that "practice of the law
is not an inherent right. It is a privilege or franchise granted by the state . . ." and in
Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958), the court succinctly pointed out that
"The right to practice law in State courts is not such a privilege or immunity as is guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment." These two decisions are buttressed by Duncan v. Missouri,
152 U.S. 377 (1894); State Bar Ass'n of Conn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra;
Christy Case, 362 Pa. 347, 67 A.2d 85 (1949).
19. State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d at 595 (Fla. 1962).
20. "The Commissioner, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, may
prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before the Patent Office, and may require
them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, to show
that they are of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the necessary
qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and as-
sistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before
the Office." 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1959).
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would very definitely be public protection; for the public would there-
after be assured of competent legal representation in the various areas
of the law. Protection of the legal profession by its very nature is
protection of the public.
In light of this decision it may be assumed that the Florida Bar
Association will take further steps to prohibit existing infringements.
NATHANIEL E. GOZANSKY
ASSESSMENT-REQUIREMENT OF FULL CASH
VALUE AND ITS JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A corporate property owner filed suit to enjoin the tax collector of
Palm Beach County from collecting taxes against its real property, al-
leging that the assessment was illegal on the ground that similar prop-
erties in the county were assessed at a much lower valuation. The
corporation did not allege that its property was assessed in excess of its
full cash value. The trial court denied the county's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, held, reversed: since the
adoption of the homestead exemption, the practice of assessing property
has conformed with the statutory requirement of full cash value, and a
taxpayer who fails to allege a valuation in excess of full cash value has
not stated a cause of action. Sproul v. Royal Palm Yacht & Country
Club, Inc., 143 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
Although the legislature has imposed the requirement of assessment
at full cash value,' for a number of years after the passage of the statute
it was nevertheless held to be common knowledge that assessments were
far below the statutory mandate.2 These assessments, however, were
upheld on the ground that the purpose of the statute was to create uni-
formity and equality of burden3 pursuant to the constitutional require-
ment.4 Consequently, if all property was assessed at fifty per cent of its
full cash value, a nominal infraction of the statute was not a ground
for a court of equity to grant relief.' This result accorded with the general
1. FLA. STAT. § 193.11 (1961). "The county assessor of taxes shall assess all property at
its full cash value."
2. Henderson v. Leatherman, 120 Fla. 496, 507, 163 So. 310, 314 (1935): "[Ilt is a
matter of common knowledge that lands nowhere in this state are assessed for state and
county purposes at more than 50 per cent of their cash value." Camp Phosphate Co. v.
Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919).
3. In Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 351, 81 So. 503, 507 (1919), the court
stated: "[Wihile it involves a nominal departure from the letter of the law, [it] does injury
to no one, and secures the uniformity of tax burden which was the sole end of the Con-
stitution."
4. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 requires the legislature to provide for a "uniform and equal
rate of taxation ... [and to] secure a just valuation of all property, both real and per-
sonal . .. ."
5. "[A]s it is a matter of common knowledge that the several assessors of this State .
